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ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHES
AND FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE-DOES




Maritime flags are a symbol of nationality.' As such, they
are generally thought to be important in determining when a re-
lationship exists between a state and a ship and, thus when a
vessel is subject to the law of that state.2 The flag of a vessel
serves two different functions: it is a symbol of the nationality of
the ship, which consequently designates the national law gov-
erning the affairs of the vessel, and it identifies the location of
those responsible for the vessel.3
For at least the last thirty years, the practice of some ship-
owners of registering their ships under the flags of states with
less stringent manning and safety requirements than states
which traditionally have set the standards of safety, has led to
controversies. Some states offer vessel registration under condi-
tions that impose fewer financial and administrative burdens
than those which are imposed by other states. Economic rather
than political considerations usually account for an owner's deci-
sion to flag or to re-flag a vessel.4 These practices have waxed
and waned over time. During the nineteen fifties, for example,
the United States' maritime unions waged a complex campaign
t Professor of Law, Director, International Legal Studies Program, Syracuse Uni-
versity, College of Law.
Comment, The Nationality of Ships and International Responsibility: The Re-
Flagging of the Kuwaiti Oil Tankers, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 207 (1988).
2 Id.
I Wachenfeld, Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A U.S. Response in the Persian Gulf,
1988 DUKE L.J. 174, 177 (1988).
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against flags-of-convenience 5 shipping. Relying on favorable in-
' The phrase "flags-of-convenience" has been defined in the following terms:
The term "Flags-of-Convenience" is commonly used- and is used in this Re-
port-to describe the flags of such countries as Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and
Costa Rica, whose laws allow-and indeed make it easy-for ships, owned by for-
eign nationals or companies to fly these flags. This is in contrast to the practice in
the maritime countries (and in many others) where the right to fly the national
flag is subject to stringent conditions and involves far reaching obligations.
Maritime Transport Committee, Organization for European Economic Cooperation,
Study on the Expansion of the Flags of Convenience Fleets and on Various Aspects
Thereof, Jan. 31, 1958, at 2 (mimeographed material).
This phrase has been used in the pejorative, commendatory, and neutral contexts.
An example of the first may be found in the statement of Hoyt S. Haddock, Executive
Secretary of the AFL-CIO Maritime Committee, Hearings on Study of Vessel Transfer,
Trade-in, and Reserve Fleet Policies Before the Sub-Committee on the Merchant
Marine of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 12, pt. 2, p. 694 (1957). See also Omar Becu, Fighting the Pirate Flags, 124
FREE LABOR WORLD 59 (1959). Examples of the commendatory may be found in, Libe-
ria's Merchant Fleet, 8 LIBERIA TODAY 12 (1959), and in, BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE:
AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY (1962) [hereinafter BOCZEK]. Neutral uses of the term
can be found in West India Fruit and Steamship Co., 113 NLRB 343, 364 (1961); Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, The Role of the U.S. Merchant
Marine in National Security (1959) ("Project Walrus" Report by the Panel on Wartime
Use of the U.S. Merchant Marine of the Maritime Research Advisory Committee) Na-
tional Academy of Sciences Publication 749 [hereinafter "Project Walrus"]; and Chasing
the Runaways, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1962, at 709.
It may be noted that, although the definition quoted at the outset of this footnote
names Panama, Liberia, Honduras, and Costa Rica as flags-of-convenience states, this
list is not exhaustive nor necessarily up-to-date. Thus, the Venezuelan flag flies from the
sterns of a small American-owned fleet. On the other hand, Costa Rica has repealed her
flags-of-convenience legislation. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1958, at 57, col. 4.
At about the same time as Costa Rica's repeal two nations decided to join the group
of states offering easy terms for the registration of ships. These are Lebanon, See N.Y.
Times, May 27, 1958, at 62, col. 6 and Tunisia, See N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1958, at 61, col.
4. It is perhaps likely that more states will be added to the list for prestige or revenue
purposes from time to time, especially if the original members should increase their taxes
or improve their standards of seaworthiness. In this regard, coincidences in the history of
Panamanian registration are illuminating. See Mender, Nationality of Ships: Politics
and Law, 5 ARKIv FOR SJORETT 126, 279-80 (1961) (especially notes 19, 20 and accompa-
nying text).
For connotations of the phrase "PanLibHon" with reference to shipping (formerly
"PanLibHonCo" when Costa Rica's law offered that nation's flag-of-convenience to for-
eign shipowners, see the definition given by the National Labor Relations Board in West
India Fruit and Steamship Co., 130 NLRB 343, 364 and n. 82 (1961): " 'PanLibHon' is
the term usually employed in referring to 'flag-of-convenience' ships of Panamanian, Li-
berian and Honduran registry.") See also, Comment, The Effect of the United States
Labor Legislation on the Flag of Convenience Fleet, 69 YALE L. J. 498 (1960); The "Ef-
fect of the Genuine Link" Principle of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the National
Character of a Ship, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1049 (1960); Comment, PanLibHon Policy and
the Problems of the Courts, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 711, 722 (1960). On the importance of the
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/3
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terpretations of the Norris-LaGuardia Acts (which, in brief, pro-
hibits the federal courts from issuing labor injunctions) they
have pressed the advantages of direct action on the docks.7 Not
only were the unions favored on the waterfront, they could also
expect to receive a sympathetic hearing before the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB). s Prior to the Supreme Court's de-
flag in this sense, see, e.g., Case of the S.S. "Lotus", 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser.A) No. 10, at 25;
The Creole (United States v. Great Britain), 2 MOORE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
258, 361; R. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876); Marshall v. Murgatroyd, 6 L.R.- Q.B. 31 (1870);
R. v. Anderson, 11 Cox. Crim. Cas. 269 (1860). See also United States v. Flores, 289 U.S.
137 (1933). Cf. the predicament of a ship without a lawful flag, Molvan v. Attorney-
General for Palestine, 1948 A.C. 351 (P.C.). For a critical comment on the general ac-
ceptance of "the flag" as synonymous with a ship's nationality, see RIENOW, THE TEST OF
NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT SHIP (1937) 140-53, especially 146-51 and n. 54; and com-
pare with the broad general use of the phrase, his statement (at 152): "It is the authori-
zation behind the flag which is significant."
A final point of definition may be made regarding the reference to the term "flag." It
is taken as the indicator of a ship's nationality and as a short form of the more techni-
cally accurate phrase "colours and pass", see The Vrouw Elizabeth, 5 C. Rob. 3, 5, 165
Eng. Rep. 676, 677 (Adm. 1803) (a more modern rendering of Lord Stowell's phrase
would be "flag and documents of registration"). See also RIENOW, supra at 140-41 ("The
significance of the flag is internationally recognized. It symbolizes nationality in actual
practice as well as in the terminology of international engagements," (footnotes omit-
ted)). The term "flag" is taken in many modern writings as a shortened term for refer-
ring to, and as the outward symbol of, a ship's nationality.
6 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), also known as the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1947.
The degree of the United States maritime trade unions' interest in this campaign
may be illustrated by the following statement (from "Brief for the United States as ami-
cus curiae", p. 20, McLeod v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores 372 U.S. 10, 8 S.Ct. 1553
(1962)): "As a result of ... foreign registrations, employment on American-flag vessels
has dropped sharply - from 158,860 positions in 1945 to 84,300 in 1951, to 57,507 in
1955, and to 49,281 in 1960." See also The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on
the Flag-of-Convenience Fleet, 69 YALE L.J. 498, 499-50, 502-03 (1960).
8 West India Fruit and Steamship Co., 130 NLRB 343 (1961), was the first leading
decision of the Board exhibiting an application of the "balancing contacts" theory to the
jurisdictions of the Labor Acts. (It had originally been enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Lauritzen v. Larsen 345 U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921,97 L.Ed. 1254(1953), as providing juris-
dictional criteria for cases under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.§ 688 (1958).) See also Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Co. (1959), 358 U.S. 354, and Benz v. Compania
Noviera Hidalgo 353 U.S.138, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1957). The "balancing con-
tacts" theory of the West India case was applied to assert jurisdiction over foreign-flag
ships by the Board in Peninsular a Occidental Co., 132 NLRB 10 (1961); Eastern Ship-
ping Corp., 132 NLRB 930 (1961); Hamilton Bros. and Sindicato Maritimo Nacional de
Honduras 'Sindimar', 133 NLRB 868 (1961); United Fruit Co.,134 NLRB 287 (1961). In
all these cases the Board utilized Lauritzen v. Larsen tests to extend its jurisdiction and
to lend its support to the claims of American maritime labor against flags-of-convenience
vessels. It should, perhaps, be noted that in Lauritzen v. Larsen these tests had been
formulated to read down the phrase "any seaman" in the Jones Act.
3
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cisions in the Empresa cases9 and the Incres Steamship Co.,
Ltd. v. International Maritime Workers Union'° case, the
NLRB had given an extended meaning to the jurisdictional pro-
visions of its enabling act" and favorably heard the claims of
American maritime labor against some categories of foreign-flag
shipping. The extended operation given to the National Labor
Relations Act 2 not only provided the unions with a forum for
asserting their claims, but further excluded action in the State
courts by the shipping companies through the application of the
Garmon doctrine. 3
After the reversal of the Board's decisions by the Supreme
Court in the Empresa and Incres cases for lack of jurisdiction,
the unions' strategies suffered a major setback. Subsequently,
the union's interest in the manning and safety controversy lan-
guished. In part, this has been due to the unions' defeat in the
Court which led to having the doors of NLRB closed to them in
regard to manning and safety claims. It has also been due to the
chronic failure of the United States to remain competitive in the
shipping industry since the 1950's.
States have two responsibilities in the flagging of ships. The
first responsibility arises in the decision whether or not to flag
the vessel. Since international law places so few restrictions on
the right to grant nationality to ships, this responsibility is ful-
filled easily. Thereafter, other states are obliged to recognize the
ship's nationality as being that of the flag granting state.
The second responsibility arises when the flagged vessel
sails. The flag state has a general obligation to insure that it's
9 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras 372 U.S. 10 (1963);
[hereinafter cited as Empresa cases on account of the names of the two cases argued,
decided and reported with it, namely McLeod v. Empresa Hondurena deVapores and
National Maritime Union v. Empresa Hondurena deVapores].
,0 Incres Steamship Co. v. International Maritime Workers' Union, 372 U.S. 24
(1963).
11 28 U.S.C. §151 (1988).
12 29 U.S.C. §151 (1988).
, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In this case
the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was pre-empted from the State courts in any
case which was "arguably subject" to the Board and the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. §151 (1988), until the Board has refused to act in the dispute. See the applica-
tion of this doctrine by the New York Court of Appeals in the Incres case, 10 N.Y.2d
218, 176 N.E. 2d 719, 219 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1961). This was later reversed by the Supreme




flagged vessels neither impede nor endanger other states in their
use of international waters.14
More recently, the antagonism to the practice of using flags-
of-convenience to avoid stringent controls of shipping has in-
creased. Enviromental and conservation groups, which, in the
context of domestic industrial activities, have not been known to
have interests sympathetic with those of the maritime trade un-
ions, are the new opponents.
Over the years, transnationally operating agreements and
international agencies have developed, at least in part, to re-
strain pollution damage to the oceans, enhance the rational use
of resources, and to protect the mammal life of the sea. As a
result, the arbitrary and individualistic interests which resort to
flags-of-convenience may be seen as increasingly anachronistic.
These interests resist the circumambient development of a legal
consciousness by remaining a legal device for circumventing the
law. This paradox is still possible because there remains in this
modern world, where state sovereignty survives, the constantly
eroding ancient principle of the exclusivity of the sovereignty of
the flag state, regardless of the flag or the state's actual relation
to the ship or the relevancy of its laws to the rational use of the
oceans from the point of view of international community
values.
This article will review the problem of flags-of-convenience
in terms of the growing consciousness of the need for interna-
tional maritime environmental and conservationist regulations.
It will, of course, be confronted by a paradox: states which fol-
low flags-of-convenience policies may lawfully and appropriately
call upon countries opposing flags-of-convenience practices to
recognize and respect those flags. On the other hand, these flags-
of-convenience states may become increasingly subject to pres-
sures to amend their domestic laws to limit the permissiveness
of their ship registration criteria and procedures. Indeed, some
states may eventually insist upon their right to refuse to recog-
nize such flags-of-convenience registration on the grounds that
to accord this recognition would give effect to the rights and
classifications contrary to their local policies and laws. This view
14 INTERNATIONAL WATERS, also known as the high seas, is the area beyond the terri-
torial sea. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 24, art. 1.
1991]
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contrasts with the traditional view taken by scholars such as Dr.
Boleslaw Boczek in his book Flags-of-Convenience: An Interna-
tional Legal Study.15 The categorical position taken in this book
asserts that states have the unequivocal right to admit ships to
their registries and that other states are obliged to recognise the
unilateral exercise of this right. According to Dr. Boczek, states
themselves are authorised to decide under what conditions they
will grant nationality to merchant vessels. Once granted, this re-
gistration must be recognised by other states"8 since "[Tjhe au-
thority given by a State for a ship to fly its flag ought to be
construed as constituting a grant of its nationality by the State
to the ship.... "
Boczek presents the thesis that while permissive norms of
apparently unlimited extent confer upon all states an absolute
right to grant their nationality to ships "for all purposes,"' a in-
ternational rules of obligation exist which bind all other states to
recognize and receive into their legal systems the granting states'
creations of rights and classifications. Such a juxtaposition of
norms of obligation and permission is extremely arbitrary. Inevi-
tably this thesis gives rise either to the unresolvable opposi-
tion,19 in the field of international action, of equally valid but
conflicting classifications under the domestic laws of different
States, or to the elevation of the PanLibHon20 states to the sov-
ereign positions so aptly depicted in Lord Ellenborough's rhetor-
ical question: "Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the
" BOCZEK, supra note 5 at 94, 102-03, 106, 288.
1I Id.
" Id. at 102. See also Goldie, Book Review, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 989.
" BOCZEK, supra note 5, at 289.
" For a discussion of this conception of opposition or "opposability", see Rundstein,
Rechtgrundsatze des Volkerrechte und Fragen der Staatsangehorigheit (1931) ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FUR VOLKERRECHT 14, 44-65. Rundstein, at 50, defined "opposability", in the
field of nationality law, as follows:
[I]f a State has in decisions concerning nationality scrupulously followed domestic
law principles and regulations, a second defendant or claimant State or a third
interested State would recognize the correctness of the procedure and the State's
right to do as it did, while opposing or challenging the effectiveness of such proce-
dure on the grounds that it is in contravention of an equally tenable position (on
the basis of principles and regulations of their own State) regarding nationality.
Id.




rights of the whole world?"''2
I. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
The reflagging of tankers must be justifiable on its own mer-
its as a reflagging under the international and domestic stan-
dards that govern vessel registration." The international stan-
dard is embodied in the concept of the "genuine link" doctrine
that was addressed in three specific conventions: (1) the Conven-
tion on the High Seas of 1958;23 (2) the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS III);24 and (3) the
Convention on Conditions for the Registration of Ships
25(UNCTAD).2
A. Treaty Formulations
Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention on the High Seas
provide:
Article 5
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nation-
ality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for
the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State
whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine
link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. 26
2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the
right to fly its flag documents to that effect.2 7
21 Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192, 194, 103 E.R. 546, 547 (K.B.) (1808).
22 See, e.g., Wachenfeld, supra note 3, at 177-83.
23 CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. See art. 5.
24 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, done at Montego Bay, Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.62/122(1982), U.N. Sales No. E.83. V. 5 (1983)[hereinafter
UNCLOS III]. See art. 91 and art. 92.
15 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, CONVENTION ON CON-
DITIONS.FOR REGISTRATION OF SHIPS, U.N. Doc. TD/RS/CONF./23, adopted by the United
Nations Conference on Conditions for the Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986 [hereinafter
UNCTAD].
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Article 6
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties
or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on
the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or
while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of owner-
ship or change of registry.2
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using
them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nation-
alities in question with respect to any other State, and may be
assimilated to a ship without nationality.29 These provisions are
substantially, rather than exactly, reiterated in articles 91 and 92
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 30
Article 97 of UNCLOS III, which reiterates article 11 of the
Convention on the High Seas,3 1 provides as follows:
Article 97
Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision
1. In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation
concerning a ship on the high seas, involving the penal or discipli-
nary responsiblity of the master or of any other person in the ser-
vice or the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be in-
stituted against such person except before the judicial or
administrative authorities either of the flag State or of the State
of which such person is a national.3 2
2. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued a master's
certificate or a certificate of competence or license shall alone be
competent, after due legal process, to pronounce the withdrawal
of such certificates, even if the holder is not a national of the
State which issued them.3
3. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of inves-
tigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of
the flag State.3 4
28 Id. at art. 6.
29 Id.
30 UNCLOS III, supra note 24, at art. 91 and art. 92.
" Convention on the High Seas, supra note 23, at art. 11.






As the International Law Commission pointed out in it's
commentary to draft article 35 Concerning the Law of the Sea,
this article is limited in scope. 5 It is a penal provision directed
to allaying the disquiet of "international maritime circles" 6 to
which the Permanent Court of International Justice gave occa-
sion by its decision in the Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v.
Turk.). 7 Article 97, like article 11 of the Convention on the
High Seas, restates and adds to the International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Penal Jurisdiction in
Matters of Collisions and Other Incidents of Navigation (Brus-
sels Convention).3 S It was the product of a diplomatic conference
held in Brussels in 1952 to deal with the specific issue which the
Lotus case precipitated - namely the recognition that a state,
other than that of the ship which inflicted the injury, may try
the responsible officers. In that case, the S.S. "Lotus", a French
steamer, collided with a Turkish flag vessel on the high seas, re-
sulting in the sinking of the Turkish flagged vessel and the
death of Turkish citizens. The Permanent Court of International
Justice upheld the right of the non-flag state (Turkey) to arrest
and try for manslaughter the officer during whose watch the col-
lision took place. The after-shocks of this decision led to the
Brussels Convention.' This agreement effectively reversed the
holding for most major maritime cases and restored what had
previously been viewed as the customary international law of the
sea. As such, this was incorporated into the article 97 of UN-
CLOS III4 and 11 of the Convention on the High Seas."'
The International Law Commission also pointed out that its
35 Id.
36 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 8
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.INT'L
L.COMM'N 281, U.N. Doc.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1, Sales No. 1956.V3, Vol. II (1956)[herein-
after COMMISSION REPORT].
"' The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J.(Ser. A.) No. 10.
" INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO
PENAL JURISDICTION IN MATTERS OF COLLISION OR OTHER INCIDENTS OF NAVIGATION, done
at Brussels, May 10, 1952 [hereinafter BRUSSELS CONVENTION]. For a history of the cir-
cumstances leading to the Brussels Convention see Jessup, The Growth of the Laws, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1935).
"9 BRUSSELS CONVENTION, supra note 38.
40 UNCLOS III, supra note 24, at art. 97.
' CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS, supra note 23, at art. 11.
1991]
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1956 draft of what became article 11 of the 1958 Convention "2
was not intended to have effect on "private international law is-
sues arising out of the question of collision"."s On the other
hand, the limitation on non-flag states' competence with regard
to visiting penal consequences on the negligent navigation of
ships on the high seas might be of considerable significance for a
coastal state whose shores may be badly polluted by a maritime
collision or stranding.
In May 1967, the Liberian flagged supertanker, the Torrey
Canyon, spilled 100,000 tons of crude oil into the English Chan-
nel, causing extensive damage to both the English and French
coastlines. The inadequacy of existing domestic and interna-
tional legal principles relating to marine oil pollution casualties
was exposed by the ensuing difficulties in resolving the numer-
ous compensation claims and liability issues raised by the vari-
ous claimants in that case. While the civil claims arising from
the Torrey Canyon disaster, for example, remained unaffected
by the Brussels Convention and the Convention on the High
Seas, Liberia took exclusive charge of the penal aspects. As a
result, a Liberian Board of Investigation sitting in Genoa penal-
ized Captain Rugiati, the master of the Torrey Canyon, by re-
moving his master's certificate. It is regrettable that the Board
was apparently suspected of refusing to inquire into the issue of
the ship's seaworthiness.4 It would seem the Brussels Conven-
42 Id.
43 CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS, supra note 23.
" Goldie, Book Review, (PETROW, IN THE WAKE OF THE TORREY CANYON (1968);
COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); J. SMITH, TORREY CANYON
POLLUTION AND MARINE LIFE (1968) and GRILL, BOOKER AND SOPER, THE WRECK OF THE
TORREY CANYON (1967)) 1 J. MAR. L & COM. 155, 159 (1969). This author expressed his
disquiet with the Liberian Board of Investigation and the outcome of it's hearings in the
following paragraph:
This reviewer regrets most emphatically that the United Kingdom, even if moti-
vated by a traditionalist's respect for the jurisdiction of the flag state (whatever
the flag), felt herself to be precluded from holding her own Maritime Board of
Investigation. She could still have established a House of Commons Committee of
Inquiry, or a Royal Commission, and taken the evidence of the British and French
eyewitnesses whose testimony the Liberian Board, so Cowan and Petrow aver,
never even sought. If such an inquiry had been held, could the Union Oil Com-
pany, the Barracuda Corporation, and the Torrey Canyon's officers at the time of
the casualty, including Captain Rugiati, have afforded to withhold their testi-
mony? Could the members of the Liberian Board themselves have disregarded the




tion and its progeny, cast a fig-leaf of respectabililty over the
question of the ship's seaworthiness, or lack of it. Had the vessel
been found unseaworthy, the owners would not have been able
to limit liability nor would the captain's masters certificate have
been revoked.'5
While the basis of maritime jurisdiction in coastal waters
tends to be in terms of the categories of the exclusive claims
which states assert offshore, the authority that states claim on
the high seas has traditionally been seen as stemming from the
exclusive jurisdiction that states assert based on the flags the
ships fly. While the Lotus Case denies this proposition,'46 it is
upheld by the Brussels Convention. Apart from some recent and
tentative treaty developments, and the customary international
law privilege arising from a state of emergency of abating a nui-
sance on the high seas, the basis for controlling pollution on the
high seas is still through the flag state's laws. These laws may
bind its own shipping to respect the integrity of the environ-
ment. But that is a matter of unilateral decision and is the pol-
icy choice of each individual state. In matters of the world com-
munity interest in protecting the environment from the
pollution of the oceans, it is a most haphazard approach, made
all the more risky by the current practices of many international
oil corporations' 7 (and other extractive enterprises) of register-
ing their giant, sometimes poorly maintained and negligently
navigated, fragile tankers under the so-called flags-of-
convenience.' 8
quiry would have generated?
Id.
" See, e.g., Owners Off the Hook, THE ECONOMIST, May 6, 1967 at 59.
4 Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No. 10.
17 According to the EXXON Oil Corporation, a tanker with a 28 man crew costs
$560,000 dollars a year to run if registered in the Phillipines but 2.5 million dollars if it is
registered in the United States. Heneghan, Shipping Guidelines, Reuters North Euro-
pean Service, April 12, 1982, (Reuters Ltd.).
48 See, e.g., BOcZEK, supra note 5.
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B. The International Court of Justice's "Genuine Link" Doc-
trine: An Unruly Metaphor for Ships49
Responding to a comment by Professor van Panhuys,
Professors McDougal and Burke pointed out the central diffi-
culty in applying the "genuine link" doctrine to the nationality
of ships. They stated:
Our reference to Piofessor van Panhuys' views was in the context
of a demonstration that no one has as yet suggested an empirical
meaning for "genuine link" as applied to ships, in terms of the
common interests of states. Professor van Panhuys does not in his
present note suggest any such meaning. We remain of the opinion
that it is an impossible task for anyone - third party decision-
maker or other - to identify such meaning.50
In this brief passage, the authors criticise the extension of
the "genuine link" doctrine from the law of nationality (where
the International Court of Justice enshrined it, not without con-
siderable criticism, in the Nottebohm Case5l) to the interna-
tional law of shipping. Professors McDougal and Burke's brief
comment is more than a "Footnote."52 It is a challenge. How-
ever, their animadversions have not deterred the International
Law Commission, the 1958 United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1),5 3 UNCLOS III,"' and, most re-
cently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD), 55 that the "Footnote" deem indeterminate.
Once those indeterminacies have been identified, we need not
despair of reformulating them in a less indeterminate language.
Indeed, UNCTAD has already begun the process.
In article 29 of the International Law Commission's 1956
Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea, 56 which resembles arti-
49 van Panhuys, The "Genuine Link Doctrine" and Flags of Convenience, 62 AM. J.
INT'L L. 942 (1967).
50 McDougal & Burke, A Footnote, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 943 (1968).
" Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), 1955 I.C.J. 4.
52 Supra note 50.
" UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (24TH MTG.), SECOND COM-
MIrEE (HIGH SEAS GENERAL REGIME) 64, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40, U.N. Sales No. 58.
V.4, Vol. IV (1958) (hereinafter UNCLOS I].
" UNCLOS 11, supra note 24.
" UNCTAD, supra note 25.




cle 5 of the Convention on the High Seas, the Commission for-
mulated the requirement of the "genuine link" and permitted
states to sanction other states by refusing to recognise their
flags. The Commission's formulation was as follows:
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nation-
ality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for
the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State
whose flag they are entitled to fly. Nevertheless, for purposes of
recognition of the national character of the ship by other States,
there must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.
2. A merchant ship's right to fly the flag of a State is evidenced
by documents issued by the authorities of the State of the flag.5 7
The issue of recognition that the International Law Com-
mission identified as providing a sanction behind the "genuine
link" doctrine reflects the International Court of Justice's hold-
ing in the Nottebohm Case.5 In this case, the Court did not
question the domestic law validating Liechtenstein's grant of na-
tionality to Friedrich Nottebohm 9 It did, however, find that
under international law it was not opposable to Guatemala who
was not obliged to recognise the grant through the lack of a
"genuine link."60 The Court stated that:
Guatemala had not recognised Liechtenstein's title to exercise
protection in respect of Nottebohm. It then considered whether
or no[t] the granting og nationality by Liechtenstein directly en-
tailed an obligation on the part of Guatemala in regard to the
exercise of protection."
In the Commission's commentary on its formulation of the
"genuine link" proposal, it observed (in harmony with the Mc-
Dougal and Burke "Footnote") that it did not "consider it possi-
ble to state in any greater detail what form this link should
take."62 However, the Commission stressed that a State's grant
of the right to fly its flag "cannot be a mere administrative for-
57 Id.
" Nottebohm Case (Liecht. v. Guat.) (Second Phase) 1955 I.C.J. at 78.
59 Id.
:0Id.
6i Id. See also text accompanying notes 83 to 97.
62 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 279.
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mality," 63 and in this context it emphasised the need for an ef-
fective control of the ship. Regretfully, while the Commission ac-
cepted the fact that the formulation of regulations could "not
prevent abuse," '64 the Commission added that it:
[T]hought it best to confine itself to enunciating the guiding prin-
ciple that, before the grant of nationality is generally recognized,
there must be a genuine link between the ship and the State
granting permission to fly its flag. The Commission does not con-
sider it possible to state in any greater detail what form this link
should take. This lack of precision made some members of the
Commission question the advisability of inserting such a stipula-
tion. But the majority of the Commission preferred a vague crite-
rion to no criterion at all. While leaving States a wide latitude in
this respect,the Commission wished to make it clear that the
grantof its flag to a ship cannot be a mere administrative formal-
ity, with no accompanying guarantee that the ship possess a real
link with its new State.6 5
At its 348th meeting, the Commission's members discussed
the question of recognition and, although they did not mention
the Nottebohm Case by name, they were clearly guided by its
principle when they accepted Professor Scelle's observation that:
It would be for third States to decide whether a genuine link ex-
isted between the ship and the State of new registration and con-
sequently whether the ship was entitled to fly its flag. The situa-
tion was analogous to a disagreement between two States over the
nationality of an individual."
C. The Nottebohm Case's Relevance to Flags-of-Convenience:
Ocean Pollution Issues
The Nottebohm Case turned on the issue of whether Fried-
rich Nottebohm's speedy naturalization as a national of Liech-
tenstein was "opposable to," and so entitled to recognition by,
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that a qualifying individual had to be accepted into a "Home
Corporation" (a Liechstenstein commune) and was required to
produce documents showing a continued residence in the Home
Corporation for upward of three years.6 7 Nottebohm arrived in
the country of his adoption (Liechtenstein) in the beginning of
October.6 8 He applied for admission as a national of Liechten-
stein on October 9, 1939 and was accepted into the Commune of
Mauren which conferred its citizenship on him on October 15,
1939.69 Furthermore, a document signed on behalf of the Princi-
pality, dated October 20, 1939, testified to the fact that Not-
tebohm had been naturalized on October 13 of that year. 70 Upon
the grant of Liechtensteinian nationality, Nottebohm promptly
applied for and obtained a Liechtenstein passport. This was vi-
saed by the Guatemala Consul General in Zurich on December 1,
1939.71 He was thus able to enter Guatemala as a Liechtenstein
national in 1939. Prior to receiving his naturalization certificate,
Nottebohm paid 25,000 Swiss francs to the Commune of Mauren
and 12,500 Swiss francs to Liechtenstein.7 2 He paid an addi-
tional 1,000 Swiss francs as an amount owing for an "annual nat-
uralization tax,"73 and further deposited 30,000 Swiss francs as
security for his further obligations with respect to that tax .7
The International Court of Justice did not question the au-
thority of Liechtenstein, as a sovereign state, to legislate its own
rules regarding the conferral of its nationality. The Court stated
this was a matter falling entirely within the state's domestic ju-
risdiction.75 However, the Court did hold that a state's claim to
exercise protection of its citizens in the international arena (spe-
cifically, on whether Nottebohm's naturalization could be suc-
cessfully invoked against Guatemala) depends on international
criteria.7 In finding that the naturalization in this case could
not be so invoked, the Court said:
17 Nottebohm Case (Liecht. v. Guat.) (Second Phase) 1955 I.C.J. 76, 77.
Id.




73 Id. at 78.
74 Id.
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The character thus recognized on the international level as per-
taining to nationality is in no way inconsistent with the fact that
international law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules gov-
erning the grant of its own nationality. This was so, failing any
general agreement on the rules relating to nationality. It has been
considered that the best way of making such rules accord with the
varying demographic conditions in different countries is to leave
the fixing of such rules to the competence of each State."
In subsequent paragraphs, the Court amplified this criterion
of the concordance between the legal bond of nationality and the
social reality of the individual's nexus with the community by
uttering emphatic phrases stressing the need for the individual's
genuine linkage, in terms of reciprocal rights and duties, with
the state of his nationality.7 8 The nationality conferred should
appear as real and effective as the exact judicial expression of a
social fact of a connection.7 9 The Court concluded with the ob-
servation that Nottebohm had not so much sought Liechten-
steinian nationality to obtain "a legal recognition of [his] mem-
bership in fact in the population of Lichtenstein" 80 as to become
enabled to:
[S]ubstitute for his status as a national of a belligerent State that
of the subject of a neutral State, with the sole aim of thus coming
within the protection of Liechtenstein but not of becoming wed-
ded to its traditions, its interests, its way of life or of assuming
the obligations ... and exercising the rights pertaining to the sta-
tus thus acquired. 1
D. The Nottebohm Case and Subsequent Developments in the
Law of the Sea Deliberations
At UNCLOS I, the implicit grant of a right to refuse recog-
nition to the nationality of a ship, when a state determined an
absence of a "genuine link," came under considerable criticism.
Mr. Colclough (United States) observed that:
The third sentence of article 29, paragraph 1, raised many ques-
77 Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) 1955 I.C.J. 4 at 23.
78 Id.
71 Id. at 24.





tions. Did it merely mean that, if a particular State decided that
a ship sailing under the flag of another State had no genuine link
with the flag State, the first State was not required to allow the
flag State to afford diplomatic protection to its ship? Or, did it
mean that such a ship would become stateless, with all the at-
tendant disadvantages? 8
He added that "in addition to producing direct conse-
quences in public international law, non-recognition would also
produce consequences in private international law,"83 leading to
insecurity in transactions. He pointed out that, among the prac-
tical difficulties which would result, were the adverse effects on
property rights, "the validity of contracts executed under the
laws of the flag State, and maritime insurance." 8 A majority of
the Second Committee concurred with Mr. Colclough's criti-
cisms. Those critics of UNCLOS I pointed out that any analogy
between the nationality of individuals and ships was highly mis-
leading" and the reliance on such a metaphor would lead to
"disputes between States." ' The Second Committee, however,
retained its requirement of the "genuine link" but deleted the
clause conditioning a ship's nationality on its recognition by
other states. This deletion of the central key role of recognition
by other states in determining the relationship of the ship to it's
state of registry was potentially disruptive. 7 This formulation
was approved in the Tenth Plenary meeting8 and became incor-
porated into article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas.89 Ar-
ticle 5, with only some minor changes (but retaining the refer-
ence to the requirement of the "genuine link" between the flag
state and the ship), was incorporated into article 91 of UNCLOS
82 4 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS, SEC-
OND COMMIrrEE (HIGH SEAS GENERAL REGIME) at 64, 123 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/40,
U.N. Sales No. 58. V.4 Vol. IV (1958).
83 Id.
84 Id.
8' Id. at 65-67.
8 See comment by Mr. Bulhoes Pedreira (Brazil), id. at 66.
'7 Id. at 75. See also the Italian Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.2/L.28 (Mar. 21,
1958) at 123. This proposal, as amended was adopted by 34 votes to 4, with 17 absten-
tions. Id.
88 2 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, PLENARY MEETINGS at 20,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/38, U.N. Sales No. 58. V. 4, Vol 1 (1958).
89 CONVENTION ON THE HIGH SEAS, supra note 23.
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111.90 The final draft of the article followed the requirement of
the "genuine link" in article 5 of the Convention, namely: "in
particular, the state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and
control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying it's flag."'" This obligation was, however, spelled out in
article 94 under the rubric, "Duties of the Flag States."92
Subsequently UNCTAD had proposed a new convention in
1986.11 This spells out, in much greater detail than did article 94
of UNCLOS III, the duties of the flag state with regard to its
legal and administrative control of the ship in compliance with
the "genuine link" metaphor. But this latest convention, like the
Convention on the High Seas and UNCLOS III, does not raise
the issue of giving other states a discretion as to recognizing the
nationality of a ship based on the existence, or imputed absence,
of a "genuine link." The traditional, customary international law
duty to recognize the ship's flag remains in place as a conse-
quence of the conferral of the flag and papers by the state of
registry. In fact, in UNCTAD's preamble, 94 this new attempt to
tackle the problem of effective control reaffirms in identical
words the opening sentence of article 5 of the Convention on the
High Seas. Far from raising the issue of recognition, the pream-
ble provides that the Convention has been "prompted by the de-
sire among sovereign states to resolve in a spirit of mutual un-
derstanding and cooperation all issues relating to the conditions
for the grant of nationality to, and for the registration of,
ships."95 The implication to be drawn from this assertion in that
the duty to recognise the conferral of nationality upon a ship
remains unchanged and that a state may not look behind the
flag. All that it purports to achieve is the imposition of a sanc-
tionless duty on states when conferring the privilege of flying
their flags. In the language of the Nottebohm Case, any grant of
nationality to a ship by a state, and the consequential right of a
ship to fly that country's flag,96 is appealable to every state and
"0 UNCLOS III, supra note 24, at art. 91.
91 Id.
" Id. at art. 94.
" UNCTAD, supra note 25.
"' Id. at 1.
95 Id.
96 See, supra text accompanying note 58.
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to all the world.
II. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE AS RESPONSIBILITY-AVOIDING
DEVICES
9 7
The great weakness of the present international law gov-
erning jurisdiction over ships and shipping stems from its pre-
sent naive invitation to engage in legal fictions and responsibil-
ity-avoiding devices. Indeed, international law clearly
encourages the avoidance of its own values, rules, policies and
prescriptions as embodied in the concept of "genuine link" while
it evades the obligation of making those rules and presumptions
effective. For as long as shipowners find certain laws objectiona-
ble, they will feel encouraged to seek legal devices to evade the
laws to which they object provided that no disagreeable conse-
quences will result.96
91 These brief observations are based on two previous articles by the author. See
Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 283, 319-25 (1970); Goldie, Recognition and Dual Nationality-A Problem of Flags of
Convenience, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 254-61 (1963) [hereinafter Flags].
08 The famous case of Mortensen v. Peters, 43 Scot. L. Rep. 872 (1906) arose be-
cause a British trawler owner resorted to use of the Norwegian flag in an attempt to
bypass legislation aimed at protecting Scottish herring fisheries. The facts were as fol-
lows: Section 7 of the Herring Fishery (Scotland) Act of 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 23, and
By-Law No. 10 made in 1892 by the Fishery Board for Scotland, when read together,
brought about the outlawing of otter and beam trawling in the whole sea area of Moray
Firth between Duncansby Head and Rattray Point. Taking the view that this legislation
could be effective only against British trawlers outside territorial waters, a number of
British trawler owners proceeded to register their ships under the Norwegian flag and
the flags of other Scandinavian countries, and continued trawling as before. Their ships
were arrested. As a result Mortensen v. Peters went to the High Court of Justiciary of
Scotland as a test case. The Court held that the Act and the by-law extended to acts
done by aliens outside the three mile limit but within the proclaimed sea area. It may be
noted that the non-British flags in this case were denied their effecaciousness as protec-
tors of a law-abiding activity, not by piercing the veil of the foreign registration and
finding British ownership and control, but by an assumption of jurisdiction over the wa-
ters where the operation took place. Mortensen v. Peters was followed by a number of
prosecutions leading, however, to diplomatic protests by the flag states of the arrested
trawlers, namely Norway, Sweden and Denmark. (This technique of extending the area
of territorial waters to the place of infringement, which otherwise would be on the high
seas, rather than piercing the camouflage of the flag of convenience, also was adopted in
1954 by Peru to justify the arrest of the Onassis whalers.) Later, when international
diplomatic pressure called for the British government's repudiation of Mortensen v. Pe-
ters, Norway and the other Scandinavian countries amended their shipping laws and
excluded British-owned trawlers from their register books - so the use of their flags as
flags of convenience was no longer permissible. The jurisdiction claimed in Mortensen v.
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When a law-avoidance practice becomes widespread, it gen-
erally comes to be supported by its own evolving morality which
develops as an alternative to the traditional one embodied in the
existing rule of law9 e.g., the relation between flags-of-conve-
nience shipping and the fleets of "traditional maritime
states."1 0 While American business theorists would argue that
American seamen are entitled to the best wages and conditions
of labor they can bargain for with American shipping companies,
the defenders of flags-of-convenience would argue that American
shipowners are entitled to register their vessels under foreign
flags in order to avoid paying the wages for which American
seamen have bargained. The fictional and law-avoiding character
of the flags-of-convenience device creates this further anomaly:
The United States has entered into agreements with owners of
flags-of-convenience shipping for the purpose of providing for
Peters was thereupon limited by the Trawling in Prohibited Areas Prevention Act of
1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 8. See also 169 PARL. DEB., H. L. (4th ser) 985, 988-9 (1907), and 170
PAR DEB., H.L. (4th ser.) 1379 (1907). The effect of the act was to prohibit the landing or
selling, in British ports, of fish caught by otter or beam trawling in the prohibited areas,
and to create the presumption that any fish landed by a ship which had, within the
previous two months, trawled by the prohibited methods in the prohibited areas, were
fish so caught.
99 A familiar example is provided by the history of divorce in the United States. For
dramatic instance of the clash of the traditional matrimonial public policy and social
ethics and their "Nevada" alternative ethics, see The Trial of Earl Russell, 1901
App.Cas. 446. See also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (the "second
Williams case"). The notion of an "alternative ethic" is offered here as distinguishable
from the notions of both amorality and immorality. At times, however, these may be
linked as, for example, honor among thieves. Id.
"00 BOCZEK, supra note 5, at 2, classifies the "flag-of-convenience states" and the
"traditional maritime states" into two distinct and opposed categories the basis of which
is outlined in the following extract:
[W]ith regard to the grant of nationality to merchant vessels, just as in the matter
of the delimitation of the boundaries between the high seas and the territorial
waters of any particular country, or as in the issue of nuclear tests conducted at
sea, the general principle of the freedom of the seas is interpreted very differently
by different nations. Some countries consider that they have the right to grant
their flag as an unlimited prerogative; others, using the argument that every free-
dom must be limited in the interest of all, feel that they have the right to grant
their flag to vessels only if they are owned by their nationals and that all other
countries should adhere to this principle. Such differing positions reflect the con-
flicting economic interests of the nations concerned. For one group, under certain
circumstances, a liberal interpretation is convenient; for another group, a restric-
tive interpretation better serves its interests.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/3
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"effective United States control" of such vessels in times of a
United States emergency. In a book defending this policy, de-
nominated "Project Walrus" 10 1, the National Academy of the
Sciences offers the following explanation:
In the event of war it will be necessary to augment U.S. flag ship-
ping. The Maritime Administration and the Navy Department
have determined jointly that it will be practicable to bring a por-
tion of the U.S.-owned foreign-flag shipping under direct U.S.
control on the event of a national emergency. This effective U.S.
control concept is a matter of expediency, rather than choice, and
applies essentially to designated shipping under the "flags of
convenience."
Determinations regarding effective control are not founded
on governmental treaties. Assurances that specific ships will re-
vert to U.S. control are given by the U.S. owners of the ships, not
by the country of registry. Former U.S. flag vessels that were
transferred to PANLIBHON registry are under effective control
as a result of stipulations in the transfer contract approvals
granted by the Maritime Administration. Less formal agreements
apply to foreign-built shipping.
U.S. owners can register foreign-built shipping under any
friendly flag of their own choice, or transfer from one flag to an-
other at will. In the case of foreign-built PANLIBHON-flag ships,
the Maritime Administration normally negotiates agreements
with the U.S. parent companies that the ships will be made avail-
able to the United States in the event of a national emergency.
1 0 2
This inherently self-contradictory assertion provides fruitful
soil for the growth of a number of anomalous situations. On the
one hand, the traditional international law doctrine of the free-
dom of the high seas can be invoked to justify the exercise of
discretion (except insofar as this may be limited by some states'
domestic law restrictions on the privilege of registering under
their flags) by ships' owners in their selection of an appropriate
nation of registry. Yet, on the other hand, permitting the United
States to take over such ships, as if they were United States flag-
"Project Walrus," supra note 5.
10 "Project Walrus," supra note 5. See also Report by Leo A. Hoegh, Director of
the Office of Defense Mobililzation, Dec. 29, 1960 at 16 (mimeographed material); and
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20-21, West India Fruit and Steamship
Co., 130 NLRB 343 (1961).
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ged vessels, ignores the accepted international rule of law that a
ship's nationality is that of her flag and that she may not law-
fully have a dual or multiple nationality. 0 3 The policy embodied
in "Project Walrus" is clearly intended to subordinate a ship's
flag nationality to her "effective control" nationality. Accord-
ingly, it appears to contradict the traditional rule and ignores
the interests and obligations of the state of the ship's flag
nationality.
Furthermore, the issue of "United States ownership and
control" of ships has gone beyond merely the issues of national
defense and logistics. The question of whether the United States
may exercise jurisdiction over foreign flag ships has since shifted
to seamen's claims in federal courts.104 This development has
103 See McDougal, Burke & Vlasic, The Maintenance of the Public Order at Sea
and the Nationality of Ships, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 25, 57 (1960) that states: "The one
necessary limit upon the discretion of states, and a limit which appears universally ac-
cepted, is that, once a state has conferred its national character upon a vessel, other
states may not confer their national character as long as the original national character
remains unchanged."
See also McDougal & Burke, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 1058 (1962). See also the categorical statement in 1 OP-
PENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW 595 (8th ed. Lauterpacht, 1955) which reads: "But no state
may allow a vessel to sail under its flag which already sails under the flag of another
State." Id. See also the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 6, sec. 1, in text
accompanying footnote 27.
" See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Grammenos v.
Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1972); Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carrier Corp. 322 F.
Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Pzndazopoulos v. Universal Cruise Line, 365 F. Supp. 208
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); In this last case, the common theme of all these cases was enunciated
without evasion or equivocation by District Judge Cannella:
The practice in this type of case of looking through the facade of foreign registra-
tion and incorporation to the American ownership behind it is now well estab-
lished. . . Complicating the mechanics of evasive schemes cannot serve to make
them more effective. (quoting Circuit Judge Medina in Bartholomew v. Universal
Tankships, 263 F.2d 437, 442 (2nd Cir. 1959).
Id. at 213.
Judge Cannella concluded:
For the reasons set out above, it is the conclusion of this court that the foreign
incorporation of these defendants and the foreign registration of the vessel are a
facade designed to disguise American beneficial ownership, operation and control
and to avoid the consequences of the American shipping laws. The beneficial own-
ership of the defendants by American interests and the location of the defendants'
base of operations in New York are substantial contacts with the United States
and are the "heavy counterweight" necessary to overcome the law of the flag





given rise to a number of bizarre possibilities. The following pro-
vide instructive anomalies:
1. Contrary to international law, the ship may, in domestic
courts, come to be recognized as having dual 'or multiple national-
ities; or
2. Despite the flag the ship flies, her single nationality is her
purportedly dominant one, namely that of her "effective control."
If this is to be the outcome, then articles 5 and 6 of the Conven-
tion on the High Seas (and articles 91 and 92 of UNCLOS III) are
rendered ineffective in such cases; or
3. The "effective United States control" agreements entered
into between the United States government and the owners of the
flags-of-convenience ships should, necessarily, be regarded as in-
effective, leaving the flags-of-convenience state in sole legal and
validly effective control of the ship and leaving the United States
without the authority over the ship stipulated for or the jurisdic-
tion claimed; or
4. The flag-of-convenience state and owners of ships choosing
such flags are entitled, by virtue of the ship's flag, to refuse to
recognize or choose to be bound by, the "effective United States
control" agreements, or to reject them as derogations from the
flag state's sovereign authority under international law; or
5. States with which flags-of-convenience states may be in polit-
ical contention, and which may have declared a blockade or
"quarantine" against such states and their shipping, could choose
to disregard the "effective United States control" agreements, ar-
guing that such agreements do not bind third parties. They could
then treat the vessels as belonging to the flag state and hence
may, for example, seize the ships as lawful objects of high seas
blockade and even prize in time of belligerent situations and rela-
tions. This "enemy character" of the ships in question would
make a mockery of such factual considerations that they are en-
gaged in the foreign trade of the United States (a neutral) and
not that of the belligerent state which is being subjected to the
quarantine or blockade by its enemy.
Additionally, all five of these variables are relevant because
they show how flawed the international and transnational ac-
countability of states and enterprises for the catastrophes
caused by the management of flags-of-convenience to the pro-
position, (that provides the supporters of flags convenience prac-
tice with its only juridically serious supportive argument) that a
ship may only have one nationality: namely that of it's flag.
19911
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Flags-of-convenience vessels have dual or multiple nationalities.
These flaws and contradictions, moreover, provide a handsome
return to the states of flags-of-convenience registry and to the
owners of such ships, but they constitute an environmental dan-
ger to the world community.
III. FLAGS-OF-CONVENIENCE AND THE IMO1 0 5 CIVIL LIABILITY
CONVENTION 1 6
A number of coastal countries have become signatories to
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage (CLC). The treaty was an outgrowth of a 1969 Interna-
tional Conference which addressed oil pollution damage from
any escape or discharge from a "seagoing vessel" or any
"seaborne craft... actually carrying oil in bulk cargo. 10 7 The
CLC was designed to "adopt uniform international rules and
procedures for determining questions of liability and providing
adequate compensation for vessel source oil pollution."10 8 Note
should be taken of the CLC's selection of the owner of a ship as
the party to be made liable under article 3.109 The owner has
been defined as "the person or persons registered as the owner
of a ship, or in the absence of registration, the person or persons
owning the ship."11 This represents a departure from the con-
cept of the party liable in the Brussels Convention on the Liabil-
ity of Operators of Nuclear Ships,"' and the other three conven-
tions on the liability for nuclear harms which have been
developed in the last decade.1 12 All of these look to the "opera-
1 IMO is the International Maritime Organization.
106 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, done





... Convention on the Liability of Nuclear Ships, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963). Arti-
cle XXIV, para. 1 provides, "This Convention shall come into force three months after
the deposit of an instrument of ratification by at least one licensing State and one other
State." It has not yet come into force because it has not been ratified by either of the
"licensing state[s]" (i.e., the United States or the Soviet Union).
... The other three conventions on liability are:
(1) CONVENTION ON THIRD PARTY LIABILITY IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, done July
29, 1960, OEEC Doc. No. C(60) 93 (1961), 8 EuR. Y. B. 202 (1960);




tor", rather than to the "owner", as the accountable party. In
the conduct of ships and shipping enterprises one frequently
finds that the charterer (the "operator" of a ship) is more in
control of her than is her owner. (There are various kinds of
charter parties1 3 or agreements between the owner and the
charterer of a ship.) Under bareboat or demise 14 charters, for
example, the manning, operation, provisioning and navigation of
a ship are in the hands of the charterers - who are thus the
parties who exercise control over the ship. The owner has effec-
tively passed the control to them. The restriction of liability to
the "owner" may look suspiciously like the creation of a straw
man to answer for major maritime pollution catastrophes in
light of the practice of owners of flags-of-convenience ships.
In general flags-of-convenience practice, owners are often
conduits and therefore, amount to little more than the name of a
company which exists in a file drawer and on a brass plate.
Their practice frequently has been, prior even to the ordering of
the ship, to give long-term demise charters (fixed term leases, as
contrasted with "voyage charters"'1 5 or leases for a simple voy-
age and not fixed by a period of time) to the enterprises for
whose benefit the ships were built in the first place. This con-
tract provides the security for the bank loans needed to finance
the cost of building the ship. The installments of the charter
party (rent) are used to pay off the financial obligation incurred.
The Torrey Canyon"6 provided an example of this practice. She
was owned by the Barracuda Corporation which demised the
ship to the Union Oil Company (charterer). The charterer's pay-
May 21, 1963, IAEA Doc. CN.12/46, 2 I.L.M. 727 (1963); and
(3) CONVENTION OF THE 31ST JANUARY 1963 SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE PARIS CONVENTION OF
29TH JULY, 1960, ON THIRD PARTY LIABILITY IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, Jan. 31,
1963, 2 LL.M. 685 (1963). There is a fifth embryonic agreement in a draft sponsored by
the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission.
113 The term "charter party" designates the document in which is set forth the ar-
rangements and contractual engagements entered into when one person, the charterer
takes over the use of the whole of a ship belonging to another, the owner. GILMORE AND
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 2d ed. (1975) at 193 [hereinafter GILMORE].
"' In a "demise" or "bareboat charter", the charterer takes over the ship lock, stock
and barrel and mans her with his own people. He becomes, in effect, the owner pro hac
vice, just as does the lessee of a house. Id. at 194
"' In a "voyage charter" the ship is engaged to carry a full cargo on a single voyage.
The vessel is manned and navigated by the owner. Id. at 193.
"' Torrey Canyon, 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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ments were intended to defray the Barracuda Corporation's loan
plus bank interest as well as provide a profit for the participants
in the incorporation of Barracuda.
Although, in a flags-of-convenience situation, the owner may
be a judgment-proof straw man, the CLC's limitation of the
party to be made liable to the "owner" may be salvaged by an-
other provision. The Convention requires that the parties to it
should issue a certificate to each tanker it registers, which indi-
cates that she carries a form of insurance or guarantee adequate
to compensate persons harmed by oil pollution casualties. The
Convention also provides for a right of direct action against the
insurer or other guarantor."'
States should, however, be aware of the problem of the fi-
nancial capability of the insurers or guarantors named in certifi-
cates issued by foreign countries to meet the obligations im-
posed by the Convention. May not some countries with flags-of-
convenience facilities be prepared to grant certificates of finan-
cial capability on the basis of more flimsy credit and assets than
would the "traditional maritime States," and may not the
"Gresham's law""' of maritime insurance come into being
through flag-of-convenience temptations? Article 7, paragraph 7,
of the CLC provides for consultation on this important point at
the initiative of a contracting state." But what should be that
country's next step if the consultations, in its view, should turn
out unsatisfactorily? Should that country bar vessels from it's
ports that it regards as potentially unable to meet the scale of
compensation provided for in the Convention? Could it refuse to
honor the certificate of financial capacity?
If such an amelioration of the law on the books as presented
by the Convention were accompanied by such a deterioration of
legal responsibility on the high seas by virtue of giant tankers
remaining outside that Convention's regime of responsibility,
then indeed, we all would have to "build swimming
pools"' 2" - if we could get enough clean water to fill them.
CLC, supra note 68 at 49-50.
"1 See Flags, supra note 97 at 221, n. 1, for a discussion of "Gresham's law" of
shipping in the flag-of-convenience context.
31 CLC, supra note 68 at 53
"2' See Gill, Book Review, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1967, at 794 citing an unnamed





The use of flags-of-convenience could render the owners of
giant tankers (of ever-increasing tonnage and risk to the envi-
ronment) effectively judgment proof, as a matter of fact, from
liability for harms they cause. Also, as the world's giant tanker
fleet continues to age, more and more ships become less and less
safe. This development is an inevitable consequence of tanker
economics. As ships age they tend to become the property of less
scrupulous owners, who, in order to glean their profits, make
cuts in their ship's maintenance and so in their environmental
protection costs. Thus, in order to earn a precarious living, these
vessels will increasingly become menaces on the high seas, creat-
ing disasters afloat and on the shoreline. Hence, the privilege of
registering ships under permissive flags-of-convenience will in-
creasingly create more severe problems, in the context of the en-
vironment and of liability, than that practice has done in the
past in terms of United States labor-management issues on the
waterfront and in the maritime industry. As The Economist has
pointed out, it is doubtful whether Liberia, for example, has the
means, even if it had the will, to prosecute breachers of the CLC
regulating (and eventually prohibiting) the pumping out of oily
ballast onto the common high seas of mankind."' This juxtapo-
sition of the flags-of-convenience issue with the "tragedy of the
commons" points to the need for new controls as well as new
standards. 2 '
Usually the participants in the common right welcome the
development of a regulatory system for the utilization of their
common resource which effectively restrains each from inexora-
bly working against both the good of all the other users and
against their own long-term advantage. But where even the most
insignificant party who stays outside the proposals for the ra-
tional regulation and protection of the commons has the capac-
ity of destroying the regulatory system, there remains a threat to
aphorism.
12 The Channel: Playing Canute with Pollution, ECONOMIST Apr. 10, 1971 at 77;
but see Plugging Some Leaks, ECONOMIST, May 8, 1971, at 80.
12 A response to this need has been started by the World Community to extend
that its intentions have been embodied in articles 22, 23, 41, 61, 117-19 and 145 and Part
XII of UNCLOS III, supra note 25.
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the integrity of the commons. Furthermore, the gains by the
party who holds out against the system will supply the incentive
for others to quit and join the free-for-all. At the very least, non-
participation permits the non-participant to reap advantages
from the regulatory system's restrictions and imposition, inevita-
bly, of increased operating costs on all the other participants. It
is on these grounds that flags-of-convenience have increasingly
proved attractive to some ship owners.
The owners of such shipping operate on the joint assump-
tions of: (1) the existence of a regulatory system (for example an
anti-dumping or an anti-pollution convention) that ties the
hands of the maritime nations that honor it; and (2) the effec-
tiveness of the anomalies inherent in the flags-of-convenience
system to permit the flags-of-convenience owners to be loosened
from the restriction of such a regulatory system. They can thus
directly profit from that system's restraints on others. (In such a
context, of course, a flags-of-convenience state can become a
party to violation of an anti-pollution convention. It is merely
anticipated to fail, conspicuously and consistently, if not consci-
entiously, in performing its treaty obligation to police effectively
the contaminating proclivities of ships privileged to fly its flag.)
In this way, the anomalies created by resort to flags-of-conve-
nience can undermine the effectiveness of international conven-
tions directed to preventing, or at least greatly reducing, the in-
cidents of the pollution of the sea by ships. Resort to flags-of-
convenience thus exacerbates the tragedy of the already polluted
common high seas and creates the condition for undermining
any regulatory attempts to rationalize the use of that common
resource. This is, surely, a classic example in the context of mar-
itime environmental protection as "Gresham's law" was in pre-
cious metal currencies, that bad practices tend to drive out good
when external restraints either do not exist or are ineffective.123
1"3 See supra note 57 and the citation therein for a reference to a decision of a
"Gresham's Law" of shipping in Flags, supra note 97, at 221, note 1.
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